Saoirse Joy
“We should send them out… put them in the desert.” – Hayat Al-Fahad
On the 11th March 2020, the World Health Organisation officially declared that the rapidly spreading COVID-19 virus be treated as a pandemic. A month later, on the 31st March 2020, Kuwaiti actress Hayat Al-Fahad publicly called for the deportation of all non-Kuwaiti nationals amidst the crisis. Al-Fahad faced widespread backlash from those claiming her comments were ignorant; however, the pandemic thrust Kuwait’s migrant population into a period of fear and uncertainty that was categorised by job uncertainty, fear mongering, and sole blame for the spread of the virus within Kuwait. (Marie, 2020)
Migration to the State of Kuwait initially began in the 1930s-1940s, in order to meet the growing demands for labour associated with the burgeoning oil industry, and the additional infrastructure needed to facilitate the rapidly advancing society (Russell, 1989.) This continued to grow at an exponential rate from the 1970s as the escalation of oil prices lead to a massive growth in demand for foreign labour – by the 1980s, the migrant population made up 78% of the total workforce, (Birks, Seccombe, and Sinclair, 1986) and current figures estimate that Kuwaiti nationals make up only a third of the total population, and less than 20% of the total workforce population (Shah, 1986.) Kuwait’s migrant population is predominantly made up of expatriates from other Arab countries, Africa, and South/ South – East Asia; the largest population of these originating from India, and Egypt respectively. Many of these people are employed in the low-skilled labour or domestic work, meaning they often face precarious working conditions, unsuitable living conditions, and financial instability. Language barriers, as well as negative racial stereotypes, have over time consolidated their place within Kuwaiti society firmly at the bottom of the social hierarchy.
The majority of these workers enter the region through the kafala system – the system of sponsorship that essentially gives private national citizens or corporations almost complete control over a foreign workers employment and domestic status within their respective countries. The system has faced widespread criticism – detractors of kafala have criticised the inherent structural vulnerability that the system perpetrates, as the worker’s presence in their host country is entirely dependent on their work status, which in the case of migrant domestic workers (hereafter referred to as MDW’s) ties their residential status to their contractual bond with their employer. The system, which has been consistently described as exploitative, and oppressive, has come to the forefront of public discussion in recent years, following anti-racism demonstrations in Lebanon in the wake of the Black Lives Matter movement in the United States, and explosive denunciations of the treatment of migrant workers involved in the building of football stadiums for the World Cup in Qatar in 2022. While kafala technically extends to all migrants who enter the region under work permits, it is intrinsically upheld by a structure with its basis in racist ideology that deliberately classifies workers based upon their countries of origin. It is through this framework that health inequalities between not only nationals, and non- nationals begin to emerge, but also between migrant workers from ‘desirable’ countries, and those who are deemed to be lesser.
The barriers to healthcare faced by migrant workers are widely documented. Non-citizens are generally not entitled to free non-emergent care, and require some form of health insurance, or government issued health card in order to access affordable care in private clinics, or government hospitals, and although health insurance is a legal requirement established for recruiting agencies in order to import labour, the quality of health insurance varies widely based on cost, (Vital Signs Project, 2022) if even provided by the employer in the first instance. Additionally, access to health insurance is generally a right only afforded to those who are classed as legal occupants within the country. As of June 2022, there were 165,000 migrants classed as ‘irregular,’ (Shah & Alkazi, 2022) – be it through arrival to Kuwait through irregular channels, expiration of their work permits and visa, or most troubling, through the failure of their sponsor or employer to provide them with national identification cards or renewed health insurance.
The first case of COVID-19 was reported in Kuwait on the 24th February 2020 in a Kuwaiti national arriving from Iran. From that point onwards the prevalence of the virus seemed to be overwhelmingly present in the migrant, and non- national population of Kuwait (AlAhmad et al., 2020.) This fact is somewhat easily explained – COVID-19 is an airborne virus that spreads from person to person in close proximity. The migrant population of Kuwait who remained at the outset of the pandemic were largely those who could not afford the costs associated with leaving the country so suddenly – those employed primarily in low-income jobs in the construction or service industries. The living conditions that these migrants are subject to, even under normal circumstances are sub-par, but the pandemic only served to exacerbate them. Not only were this demographic significantly more at risk for contracting the virus, the discrepancy between the mortality rate of the national and non-national populous was vastly different. A study conducted in 2021 found that there was an almost 40% disparity between the percentage increase of expected mortality between Kuwaiti’s and non- Kuwaiti migrants (AhAhmad et al., 2021) – meaning that the unpredicted excess deaths that occurred in the migrant population far overshadowed that of the Kuwaiti population.
There is no concrete medical or scientific explanation for this phenomenon; however, medical issues amongst the non-native Kuwaiti population are not a recent issue. Workers are often subject to cramped, and dilapidated living conditions – although technically legislation states that there should be no more than 4 workers residing in one room, (Jafar, 2021) this is widely reported to be disrespected. Areas on the outskirts of large residential areas have become rife with apartments that market themselves as specifically for the so called ‘bachelors,’ those low-income migrant men who are prohibited to bring their families with them to Kuwait. It is not uncommon that these apartments would house up to ten times the legal maximum, as pre-pandemic the majority of these men would be employed for shift work – meaning it was rare, if not impossible, that all tenants would gather at home together at once. At the outset of the pandemic, it became mandatory for everyone to remain in their homes except under extenuating circumstances. Living in small cramped apartments, often coupled with extremely poor ventilation, and little to no amenities served as a breeding ground for the spread of the virus.
Kuwaiti response to the situation proved only to exacerbate the situation, and demonstrated the underlying bias surrounding the migrant population that has allowed tensions to boil over. In order to counter the spread of the virus in heavily migrant populated areas, Kuwait established a number of detention camps in the Kuwaiti desert during a period of amnesty for undocumented workers in order to seek repatriation. The camps that were set up did little to alleviate the problem, or prevent the spread of the virus – instead it only magnified the conditions that allowed for the spread of the virus amongst the migrant population in the first instance. Not only were detainees subject to yet more cramped conditions while confined in these camps, they were denied access to running water, sanitary conditions, essentials such as food, primary healthcare, and tools to help keep them safe from the virus – such as masks, or sanitation materials (Ullah, 2020.)
Fundamentalism had a “simple and direct articulation” which spoke to the masses whereas the project for modernity had largely been out of touch with the wider population, confined to the elite (Sharabi 140). Islamism also promised “victory [to be] inevitable” which sits in contrast with 1967 (Sharabi 140). The rise of Islamism would not have happened as swiftly had the project for modernity succeeded. In the wake of failure and frustration, fundamentalism was a perceivable “antimodernist, utopian patriarchalism … legitimate successor” that could only come about as modernity fell away (Sharabi 13). Despite the Kuwaiti government’s promise to treat everyone for the virus, a Kuwaiti doctor is said to have received “informal instructions to transfer non-Kuwaiti patients to field hospitals where the only thing you’ll find more than patients is cockroaches and dust,” (Alshammari, 2021).
At the time, tensions surrounding the spread of COVID and the rising cases had come to a head and it was migrant workers who were shouldering most, if not all, of the blame for the spread of the virus. What we can see clearly here is how the cycle of inequality is allowed to perpetuate – migrant workers are already far more predisposed to illness and poor health due to the sub-par conditions in which they live and work. Upon the arrival of COVID-19, migrants are significantly more likely to contract the virus, due to their pre-established poor health, and additionally more likely to spread the virus due to the cramped conditions in which they live and work. When they have the virus, migrants are significantly more likely to die – due in part to their poor health, in part to the unsanitary, unsuitable conditions in which they dwell, and in part due to the reluctance of the government to facilitate proper care for non-citizens.
It has become impossible to discuss the nuances of Kuwaiti society, especially within the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, without touching upon the claims of xenophobia and entrenched racism that the pandemic brought to the forefront of public discussion.
via Reuters
To call upon a blog post by young Kuwaiti professor Mai Al-Nakib that circulated online in May of 2020, “Racism and slavery, self- entitlement and corruption, education and healthcare in crisis, economy and environment on the brink — any one of these could bring down a nation-state. All of them together at once spells the end. This is where Kuwait stands today, without the leadership or a population intellectually and emotionally equipped to admit to the magnitude of the disaster, let alone to commit to its remedy,” (Al Nakib, 2020.) The supposed self-righteousness of Kuwaiti nationals is technically only mere speculation – but speculation that is heavily documented. The reasoning for said feelings of superiority can be traced back to a number of factors, but ultimately, it is incredibly difficult to quantify how and why an entire nation of people has become to see themselves as more deserving. Some young Kuwaiti’s, such as Al Nakib, suspect it comes from years of patting oneself on the back for the bare minimum. Others, such as Anh Nga Longva, surmise that Kuwaiti nationality, and Kuwaiti citizenship, was orchestrated in such a way to specifically become a commodity “not only to exclude the expatriates but also to organize and define the internal power relationships,” (Longva, 1997) – power struggles that could be argued to have stemmed from continued colonial legacies within the region, and the terse geographical and political fight for control, and fight for resources.
The treatment of migrant workers within Kuwait has recently risen to the forefront of discussion due to a number of controversies that have rendered the issues impossible to ignore. Stories out of Qatar shocked the international community as it was revealed the inhumane conditions in which workers building FIFA World Cup arenas faced, which eventually led to the implementation of reforms such as a national minimum wage, aimed at the abolition of kafala (Campbell, 2022.) In Kuwait, the murder of a Filipino domestic worker at the hands of her 17-year-old employer’s son made headlines in February of 2023 when it was revealed he had systematically raped her, and murdered her upon the discovery of her pregnancy (Ewe, 2023.)
This is not a first for Kuwait – abuses are well documented, and ignored. Class hierarchies are played out along the lines of race, ethnicity, and gender in the form of the kafala system, the very system that informs every facet of life within Kuwait. One cannot adequately discuss any aspect of Kuwaiti social stratification without the knowledge of how kafala impacts and informs. The legality, and even worse, the cultural expectation of subjugation of a specific group of people based solely on the man-made idea of a hierarchy is impossible to shift without a total shift in thinking.
While this is no doubt in motion, there are some who resist this altogether – those who defend kafala as their right, and those who used the COVID-19 pandemic as a means of consolidating their self-imposed image of superiority. If the pandemic uncovered anything about Kuwait, it is that public health is very much informed by the position of the most vulnerable within society – I would question whether or not the system of kafala is strong enough to survive much more.
via gettyimages
Bibliography:
AAlahmad, Barrak, et al. “COVID-19 stressors on migrant workers in Kuwait: cumulative risk considerations.” BMJ Global Health vol. 5 no. 7, 2020.
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Alshammari, Yousef H. “All this death for money: Kuwait’s migrant workers and the unchallenged dangers of COVID-19.” The New Arab, 28 October, 2021.
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Ewe, Koh. “She Left Home to Work 5,000 Miles Away, But Was Killed and Abandoned in a Desert.” VICE World News, 1 February, 2023.
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Shah, Nasra M., and Lubna Alkazi. “COVID‐19 and threats to irregular migrants in Kuwait and the Gulf.” International Migration, vol. 61, no. 2, 2023, pp. 138-153.
Ullah, Areeb. “’Like sardines’: Migrant workers suffering in Kuwait’s desert detention camps.” Middle East Eye, 15 March, 2020.
6 Vital Signs Project. (2022). The Cost of Living: Migrant Workers’ Access to Health in the Gulf. Vital Signs, November 2022.