Lucy Annabella Banisch
The Shifting Power Relations between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan within the Past Decade
The Nile is the longest transboundary river in the world, passing through eleven states inhabited by roughly 535 million people. It is fed by two tributaries, the White Nile and the Blue Nile, originating in the Ethiopian highlands and the Great Lakes region respectively. Ethiopia provides 86 percent of its total flow (Salman, 2011; Obengo, 2016), making it the most influential upstream contributor. Egypt and Sudan, in a long-standing alliance, have been using the water resources almost exclusively, making them the biggest beneficiaries of the river. Thus, the Nile’s hydropolitics are mostly played out in the Upper Nile basin – between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan (Swain, 2011).
Recently, the Nile basin has seen a trend of investment by emerging economies, potentially leading towards a fourth phase of Nile hydropolitics.
The basin’s history is shaped by three phases. The first, marked by colonial and post-colonial dynamics, produced the 1959 agreement that divides the Nile water today, exclusively between Egypt (55.5 billion cubic metres) and Sudan (18.5 billion cubic metres) (Tekuya, 2018). The second phase was impacted by Cold War geopolitics. This mostly shaped infrastructure development, leading to the construction of Egypt’s Aswan High Dam (AHD) and an unprecedented level of infrastructure expansion (Nicol and Cascao, 2011), with exploration potential underpinning the authority of the 1959 agreement (Matthews, Nicol and Seide, 2013). During the third phase, Western development agencies and international financial institutions became increasingly involved in the basin and a new era of cooperative efforts began. This included the start of negotiations of the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) in 1997 which aimed to institutionalise basin cooperation. The establishment of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) in 1999 provided, for the first time, a forum for dialogue and cooperation between all of the ‘riparians’, meaning all of the states including sections of the Nile basin (Cascão and Nicol, 2016). Recently, the Nile basin has seen a trend of investment by emerging economies, potentially leading towards a fourth phase of Nile hydropolitics (Cascão, Tawfik and Zeitoun, 2019). The main result of this recent period is Ethiopia’s unilateral construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), starting in 2011. Upon completion, it will be Africa’s biggest dam, putting Egypt’s AHD in second place (Negm et al. 2019a, Negm et al. 2019b). The ability of Ethiopia to fund the dam without international donors, who would not fund the project without an inter-riparian agreement, is the result of unprecedented economic growth. It is also partly the result of a high level of Chinese investment prior to the GERD construction (Tawfik, 2015; Nasr and Neef, 2016).
The Nile is crucial to Egypt’s water supply, as it supplies 94 percent of its freshwater resources (Hussein and Grandi, 2017). The river is often referred to as Egypt’s lifeline, and is a source of its national pride. Ethiopia’s relationship with the Nile also has a symbolic dimension, as the river is seen as the gateway to the nation’s rise to prosperity (Gebreluel, 2014). Although most of the Nile’s water originates in Ethiopia, the country has not been able to exploit this resource for most of its existence as an independent state, as it lacked the exploitation capacity, economic means, and regional support (Ibrahim. 2013). For Sudan, the Nile has gained particular importance since the secession of the oil-rich South Sudan, as this coincides with a loss of oil revenues and thus a higher dependence on irrigated agriculture (Tawfik, 2015). In addition to their national interests, basin-wide stressors further pressure the riparians — including rapid population growth, rising living standards, and climate change (Swain, 2011). Though the current situation thus urgently calls for sustainable and cooperative water management, the relationship between the riparians has been one of “tension, mistrust, anxiety, mystery and diplomatic confrontation” (Obengo 2016: 98). “Ethiopia’s theoretical power to divert the Nile waters is arguably the oldest, most contentious and most important foreign policy concern” in Egypt (Gebreluel 2014: 26).
Evidence against the existence of water wars does not imply that water sharing is always a peaceful process.
In 1798, the economist Thomas Malthus predicted that population growth and resource scarcity would inevitably lead to societal catastrophes that could only be resolved through violence (Verhoeven, 2011). In Neo-Malthusian thought, water is thus identified as a war-causing resource. More recently, the idea of interstate water wars has been pursued, and provisions to avoid these scenarios have been made, by various scholars (eg Starr, 1991; Homer-Dixon, 1994) and public figures, including the former UN Secretary-Generals Boutros Boutros Ghali, Kofi Annan and Ban Ki-Moon (Gebreluel, 2014). Today, the water war narrative has been widely dismissed as overly pessimistic and various studies suggest that interstate wars over water resources are highly unlikely (Wolf, 1998; Zeitoun and Mirumachi, 2008; Hussein and Grandi, 2017). However, the clear evidence against the existence of water wars does not imply that water sharing is always a peaceful process (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006). Instead, conflict and cooperation are coexisting processes in transboundary water interactions (Cascão, 2008; Zeitoun and Mirumachi, 2008; Hussein and Grandi, 2017). Therefore, although conflicts over transboundary water exist, they do not turn into transboundary wars over the shared resource. This may be because a war does not necessarily lead to control over water and can even cause the destruction of critical infrastructure, leaving all riparians in a worse position than before. Many scholars thus argue that states instead try to gain control over a transboundary water through power games and the establishment of a hydro-hegemony. Conceptually, political scientists Cascão and Zeitoun (2010) try to capture these dynamics with their ‘Framework of Hydro-Hegemony’. Their concept is composed of four pillars of power: (1) geographic power, (2) material power, (3) bargaining power, and (4) ideational power. In the context of relations between the riparians of a transboundary river, hydro-hegemony is best exemplified by a state which enforces its interests through the four pillars of hydro-hegemony in a way that ensures the compliance of other riparians, limiting the need for coercive measures, such as warfare. Whilst the power dynamics in the Nile basin stayed rather unchanged since the period of independence in the riparian countries (c. 1922-1956), the predominant order has been disrupted since the beginning of this century and most notably within the past 10 years. As this development will have significant implications not only for the states involved, but also the wider region and possibly beyond, an analysis of the power dynamics, through the lens of the ‘Framework of Hydro-Hegemony’, gives an important insight into this significant and long-lasting conflict.
Geographical power is “the distinct advantage that geography provides to an upstream state to manipulate the flows” and the unavoidable burden it places on downstream riparians (Cascão and Zeitoun, 2010a: 31). The geographic power dynamics in the Upper Nile basin have been unchanged since the independence of the three states, with Ethiopia holding the most geographic power due to its upstream position. As the midstream state, Sudan comes second, while Egypt, as the most downstream, is the geographically weakest riparian (Cascão and Zeitoun, 2010b).
Material power is a riparian’s “economic power, […] technological prowess and international political and financial support” (Cascão and Zeitoun, 2010a: 31). In the past, Egypt has had a clear lead in material strength, followed by Sudan and lastly Ethiopia (Cascão and Zeitoun, 2010b). In 2010, Egypt had by far the strongest economy, but the situation has changed during the last decade. Despite the fact that Egypt’s economy remains the strongest, Ethiopia’s saw a record economic growth, thus decreasing Egypt’s relative lead significantly. Additionally, as Sudan’s economy plummeted, Ethiopia became more economically powerful than Sudan within the past 10 years (World Bank, GDP, n.d.; World Bank, GDP growth, n.d.). Egypt remains the riparian with the most profound technological knowledge (Tekuya, 2018). However, Ethiopia’s and Sudan’s partnerships with China, India, and Turkey, powerful riparians themselves, provide the two Nile Basin states with technical knowledge and assistance, decreasing the gap between the three riparians (Nicol and Cascão, 2011; Nasr and Neef, 2016; Zeitoun et al., 2017; Cascão, Tawfik and Zeitoun, 2019). Additionally, the GERD will allow Ethiopia greater control over the Nile water resources, replacing the AHD as the Nile’s biggest dam (Matthews, Nicol and Seide, 2013). As such, the GERD represents a significant gain in exploitative capacity and material power for Ethiopia (Tawfik, 2015). At the beginning of the decade, Egypt’s material strength was also based on its access to international funding and its ability to block financing for Ethiopia (Nasr and Neef, 2016). The Egyptian influence and, conversely, Ethiopia’s poor international reputation, left the country financially isolated (Arsano and Tamrat, 2005; Cascão, Tawfik and Zeitoun, 2019). In the early 2000s, Ethiopia was eager to change its international image in order to access funding, and its engagement in the NBI opened up possibilities of financial and political support, particularly from Western donors (Cascão, 2008; Cascão and Nicol, 2016). By establishing itself as a regional leader, Ethiopia became an important ally for the Western states, which “has entailed substantial financial and military assistance as well as diplomatic support” (Gebreluel, 2014: 30). Additionally, Ethiopia and Sudan have been experiencing a wave of funding largely aimed at hydraulic infrastructure development from emerging non-Western international actors, most prominently China, India, Turkey, and the Gulf States (Matthews, Nicol and Seide, 2013; Cascão, Tawfik and Zeitoun, 2019). Ethiopia’s and Sudan’s growing access to various sources of political support and funding opportunities diminished the impact of Egypt’s influence over traditional donors and consequently reduced imbalances in material power between the riparians (Cascão and Nicol, 2016; Cascão, Tawfik and Zeitoun, 2019).
Bargaining power is expressed in a riparian’s capability “to control the rules of the game and set agendas” and “influence the terms of negotiations and agreements” (Cascão and Zeitoun, 2010a: 31). For several decades, Egypt, in alliance with Sudan, has been the strongest riparian in terms of bargaining power, as their 1959 agreement construed the rules of the game in the basin. Additionally, Egypt was most capable of controlling the water resources of the Nile, giving the downstream alliance extensive control over negotiations and agreements (Cascão and Zeitoun, 2010b). However, developments of the past decade have led to a change in bargaining power dynamics. Firstly, the NBI provided all riparians with the opportunity to participate in negotiations, which was used by Ethiopia and other upstream states to influence decisions and agenda-setting by articulating their interests in a unified way (Tekuya, 2018). Ethiopia made its participation conditional on starting the CFA negotiations (Cascão and Zeitoun, 2010b) and when they came to a deadlock, Ethiopia and other upstream states pushed ahead with the signature despite Egypt’s and Sudan’s discontent. Both of these developments disrupted the prevailing order, resulting in a loss of bargaining power for Egypt and Sudan and a gain for Ethiopia. Secondly, Ethiopia’s unilateral construction of the GERD shows a significant loss in Egypt’s ability to influence the rules of the game by preventing other riparians from controlling the water resources against Egypt’s will (Tawfik, 2015). By constructing the GERD, Ethiopia “defined the terms of negotiations over the project and forced Egypt to accept these terms”, and thus significantly increased its bargaining power (Tawfik, 2015: 9, 26). Lastly, Ethiopia’s access to new means of financing means it is not bound by inter-riparian agreements, which provides the state with leverage in negotiations (Cascão, Tawfik and Zeitoun, 2019). As a result, Egypt and Sudan are no longer in the position to block projects that are not in accordance with their interests and thus less capable of determining the rules of the game (Matthews, Nicol and Seide, 2013).
Ideational power is a riparian’s control over eminent ideas resulting in a capacity to “impose and legitimise particular ideas and narratives” (Cascão and Zeitoun, 2010a: 32). Egypt, supported by Sudan, has traditionally held the greatest ideational power by successfully dominating the existing agreements. These agreements portray Egypt’s interests as legitimate, and politicise the water resources of the Nile, labelling upstream interests as threats to its own security (Cascão, 2019). However, ideational power dynamics shifted substantially within the past decade. Through the NBI and CFA processes, Ethiopia and the upstream states could voice their interests in a prominent forum for the first time, utilising the venue to introduce a counter-narrative (Ibrahim, 2013; Tekuya, 2018). Strengthened by the support of other upstream riparians, Ethiopia leveraged the CFA process to depict Egypt and Sudan as being uncooperative and their claims as illegitimate, thus successfully calling into question the hitherto predominant narrative promoted by Egypt and Sudan (Tekuya, 2018). As a result, Egypt and Sudan experienced a rupture in their power to impose favourable ideas, allowing Ethiopia to grow in ideational capacity. By presenting the unilateral construction of the GERD as a result of Egypt’s uncooperative behaviour in the NBI, Ethiopia strengthened the formerly described narrative (Tawfik, 2016). Additionally, Ethiopia continuously presented the GERD as a potential win-win situation and was able to exclude the project’s negative aspects from the discourse, showing a substantial gain in its ability to control the discourse (Tawfik, 2016). With the Sudanese endorsement of the project in 2012, Sudan supported the Ethiopian narrative and further consolidated its growing ideational power (Cascão and Nicol, 2016; Tawfik, 2016). Additionally, this development represents a rupture in the long-lasting alliance between Egypt and Sudan, which substantially weakened Egypt’s position (Tekuya, 2018). As Egypt’s reaction to the GERD was overtly negative, Sudan’s endorsement undermined the Egyptian narrative, and Egypt was urged to change its tactic, from openly threatening to sabotage the GERD to participating in trilateral talks initiated by Ethiopia. This further signalled Egypt’s decreasing ideational capacity (Cascão and Nicol, 2016).
Whilst Egypt remains the strongest riparian in the basin when it comes to economic power, Ethiopia managed to replace Sudan as the second-strongest economy in the basin and the clear upward trend is likely to continue, further decreasing Egypt’s lead.
Although Abdulrahman (2018: 145) rightfully notes that “international relations are anarchic, especially in the area of shared watercourses”, and there lacks a central authority capable of imposing and enforcing regulations and agreements, Egypt has virtually held authority in the Nile basin for decades. Strengthened by its alliance with Sudan, the geographically weakest state was by far strongest in material, bargaining and ideational power. Since the late 1990s, with the establishment of the NBI, but especially within the past 10 years, Egypt’s authority became increasingly fragile. Within the past decade, Ethiopia’s material power has grown considerably through its economic and technological advances and its access to various sources of political and financial support. Whilst Egypt remains the strongest riparian in the basin when it comes to economic power, Ethiopia managed to replace Sudan as the second-strongest economy in the basin and the clear upward trend is likely to continue, further decreasing Egypt’s lead. In terms of bargaining power, Ethiopia has gained significant capacity through the NBI and CFA processes and the construction of the GERD. Although Egypt still is in the position to influence other riparians, its bargaining capacity decreased drastically. This also decreases Sudan’s bargaining power, making the midstream country the least powerful in this regard. When comparing Egypt and Ethiopia, Ethiopia might not have surpassed Egypt yet, but Egypt’s leadership is clearly being contested. The dynamics surrounding the NBI, CFA and the GERD have also enabled Ethiopia to narrow the gap in ideational capacity. Simultaneously, Egypt has experienced a stark reduction of its own ideational strength, partly due to the resistance to the CFA and the GERD, both of which were realised regardless, and to Sudan’s decision to break its alliance with Egypt and endorse the GERD, thus undermining the Egyptian narrative. Although it might be too soon to declare Ethiopia the leading riparian in terms of ideational strength, Egypt’s lead is certainly diminishing. However, Sudan has also gained ideational power, as they are in a position to support either Egypt’s or Ethiopia’s narrative, thus affecting Nile Basin dynamics significantly. Accordingly, ideational power might be the most disputed category among the three riparians.
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Images:
Cairo and the Nile- Nina R., geographical.co.uk
The Nile satellite image- Jacques Descloitres, MODIS Rapid Response Team, NASA/GSFC