Douce d’Andlau
According to the U.S. government, the total population of Algeria is estimated at 41.7 million (July 2018 estimates), of which more than 99% are Muslim. Islam has historically had a major influence on Algerian politics and society and is therefore intrinsically associated with Algerian ‘Arab-Islamic’ identity. Located in the heart of the Maghreb, between Morocco and Tunisia, Algeria is situated in the middle of two major geographical areas: the Mediterranean to the north and Sahara to the south. Being the largest country in Africa, Algeria is four times larger than France. The French conquest of Algeria in 1830 ended in 1847 with the submission of Emir Abd el-Kader . French colonisation both facilitated the birth of an important European settler-colonist community and of an indigenous nationalist movement whose insurrection led to the Algerian War (1954-1962) and, eventually, to the country’s independence. The National Liberation Front (FLN) emerged successful in the wake of the war and went on to become the ruling party. With its socialist project the FLN received military aid from the USSR and governed the country under a single party regime until 1989. The democratisation of the regime in the 1980s, under Chadli Bendjedid, following major protest movements, came to an abrupt end with the start of the civil war in 1991. Algeria then saw a period of conflict between the military, which continued to hold power, and various Islamist groups. In 1999, the election of Abdelaziz Bouteflika assisted in bringing order. However, Bouteflika ruled as an autocrat over Algeria and, after four successive terms, had to relinquish power on April 2, 2019.
This article primarily discusses the role religion plays in political discourses in Algeria from its colonisation to its democratisation.
The Algerian colonial period from 1830 to 1962 was characterised by a desire to assimilate the “natives,” or the populations existing in Algeria before the arrival of the French. Since being colonised , these natives had become French, but they were not French citizens.
If they wanted to become French citizens, they had to renounce Muslim personal status, a set of legal customs derived from the Qur’an, Sunna and local traditions of Islamic Jurisprudence that governed private affairs, marriage, divorce, custody, , inheritance, the legal status of children and so on and so forth . For the majority of natives, giving up this status meant being a traitor to their origins or a poor believer. In this way, Islam, being an oppressed religion, became an important aspect of Algerian nationalism during the colonial period as a mobilizer of nationalist resistance. Algeria was a heterogeneous nation with various social, political, and cultural practices, however Islam united differing factions under the banner of the anti- colonialist struggle. The assertion of an Algerian identity was thus achieved through Islam, which gradually transformed into a political nationalist movement. In some cases, Algerian Muslim institutions attempted to justify colonial domination to protect their interests, but by 1936, the first Algerian Muslim Congress was held. This marked the beginning of a reformist religious movement articulating political demands. However, these demands were primarily related to freedom of worship and language without questioning colonial domination. In short, a French Algeria but relatively respectful of Islam. Therefore, Islam became a strong symbol in a society that had been shaped by more than a century of French occupation. It led to the creation of a cohesive community around both a shared religion and a shared culture and thus laid the foundation for the development of a national identity that opposed the French government.
According to Maddy-Weitzman, 20 to 30% of the Algerian population speak Berber. However, the Algerian state chose to base the new national identity on its ‘Arab-Islamic’ identity, excluding linguistic and religious minorities. Thus, after independence, Islam was used as a means of legitimising the authority of certain rulers by conceiving religion not as a belief but more as a source of moral and social values that could be manipulated to suit the interests and objectives of the state in control.
For the future members of the FSI movement, the post-independence state’s attitude towards Islam did not correspond to their vision of a proper Islamic society: “The Algerian state of 1962 had nothing to do with what had been projected on the first of November 1954, for which we had taken up arms: an independent state founded on Islamic principles. The state that has risen before our eyes was founded on secular, socialist principles. This was a serious deviation.” By embodying official Islam, the state had control over the interpretation of Islam, which could not be diverted to serve as a rallying symbol for oppositional movements anymore. After the Algerian civil war of 1992, the FLN emphasised Article 2 of its Constitution, establishing Islam as the state religion. Public funds were used to support this mandate and indirectly impose its political influence on the religious sphere. This is exemplified by the fact that all persons working in a mosque are considered state employees. Finally, unlike Iran and its theocratic state, the Algerian state is rather headed towards a process of secularisation, which does not mean a denial of Islam but rather a historicization of it for the sake of the reinforcement of the Arab Islamic national sentiments. Algerian law clearly demonstrates the impact of religion on politics.
Proselytising non-Muslims is forbidden, converts to another religion have no right to inheritance, marriage between a Muslim woman and a non- Muslim man is forbidden, and Islamic religious education is compulsory until secondary school.
Consequently, in modern Algerian society, religious identity is intrinsically associated with political identity as a unifying national force and a powerful political asset.
“El islam houa el hal” which can be translated as “Islam is the solution” is the political message of the FIS, the Islamic Salvation Front (1989 to 1991),. The victory of the FIS in the 1990 municipal elections and in the 1991 legislative elections (where they won a ⅔ majority in the assembly) highlights the discontent felt by a part of the population since independence.
Through its use of the Muslim cultural background and a rather radical discourse, the FIS expresses its opposition to the ruling elite considered to be corrupt. This movement is inspired by the Intifada and the Iranian revolution to set up a new social and political life based on Islam and thus put a stop to the process of secularisation. As a result, Islam shifted from a medium of exclusive state control to a medium of political opposition by Islamic nationalists. It is the result of a growing gap between the development of a globalised country with secular values and a regime that considers itself the bearer of Islamic traditional values. The Islamist ideology of the FIS, among others, is a means of expressing a malaise, especially among young people who are in the globalised where traditional social and religious practices have been disrupted. Youths find in this Islamist ideology stable representatives responding to a demand for social justice as well as a feeling of belonging in a country where the transition from a rural to an urban society has destroyed the sense of community and left individuals isolated. Their political agenda was only formed in opposition to the “westernisation” of the country incarnated by a strong figure. Political Islam is particularly echoed by the “hittists” (unemployed youth) and members of the FIS who seek in Islam a rallying call rather than a quest for spirituality. Because the FIS was not a purely religious movement and used persuasion rather than power and pressure to convince, it allowed a broad range of populations to find their way in. While the FIS was soon banned, it continued to be a highly influential illegal movement, sometimes stepping into the shoes of the state when certain public services were not being provided, further underlining the feeling of abandonment among some local communities.
From the 2000s onwards, the radicalised political Islam movement fizzled out, overwhelmed by external and internal tensions and no longer reflecting the regime alternative desired by the younger generations. This decline was part of two reactions, an increasingly communitarian and restrictive Islam or a complete rejection of Islam for a world of overconsumption.
Islam has played an important role in the political life of Algerians from the time of colonial domination to the recent period of radical social upheaval . The use of Islam and its cultural and historical symbolism allowed to guide a nationalist struggle for independence and, later, to legitimise a government through the use of political Islam. It is therefore not Islamthat is behind these populist Islamist movements but the cultural identity that it conveys. In 1987, Kaeb Yacine resumed his thoughts on the construction of the Algerian nation: “Arab-Islamic Algeria is an Algeria against itself, an Algeria foreign to itself. It is an Algeria imposed by arms, because Islam is not made with candy and roses. It was done in tears and blood, it was done by crushing, by violence, by contempt, by hatred, by the worst abjection that a people can bear. We see the result.”
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