Rose Slocock
Located in the Old City of Jerusalem, a sacred hilltop holy site has long served as a flashpoint of bitter and enduring division between the Israelis and Palestinians. Known to the Jewish people as Temple Mount, and to Muslims as Haram al-Sharif, the Noble Sanctuary is Islam’s third holiest site after Medina and Mecca.
In Islam, the Esplanade’s profound religious significance is vested in the Dome of the Rock and the Al-Aqsa Mosque. The former contains the Noble Rock which leads to the Well of Souls where the dead can be heard waiting for judgement day. In Islamic tradition, the Prophet Muhammed was transported from Mecca to the great Al-Aqsa Mosque and ascended into heaven (Marjieh, 2022).
Jews venerate this same sacred compound, holding that it is where Abraham sacrificed his son, Isaac, and where God collected the dust to make Adam (Margalit, 2014). The holiest site in Judaism, the Dome of the Rock is of seminal importance in Jewish tradition, revered as the place where God revealed himself to King David. The two Jewish temples – Solomon’s Temple and the Second Temple – are also understood to have been built here. It is believed that the third temple will be rebuilt on this same ground at the coming of the Messiah (Marjieh, 2022). For many, Jerusalem does not only have religious significance but has evolved as a nationalist symbol and an emblem of national revival.
The History of ‘Status Quo’
Due to its religious significance in both Judaism and Islam, the Esplanade continues to be a major focal- point in the Arab-Israeli conflict. These prevailing tensions must be understood in the historical context of the measures and treaties negotiated to manage inter-faith and nationalist hostility.
Following disputes among European states in the 19th century over religious sites in Jerusalem, these have since been governed by the ‘status quo’ arrangement – outlined in the 1852 Firman Decree issued by the Ottoman Empire. Such a precedent was internationally recognised in the 1878 Treaty of Berlin (Lapidoth, 1998).
Originally set up to protect access to Christian sites across Jerusalem, the ‘status quo’ was widened to include Muslim and Jewish interests. This effort to safeguard competing religious rights to these sacred spaces was further entrenched after the 1967 Six-Day War. In the Aftermath of Israel’s occupation of the Old City, Jerusalem saw the first mass Jewish pilgrimage to the Old Mount since the second Temple’s destruction (Barker, 2015).
Wishing to avoid escalation, Israeli Defence Minister, Moshe Dayan, sought to solidly outline the individual entitlements of the Jewish and Muslim people in Jerusalem. Affirming the Jordanian Waqf Ministry’s formal administration of these holy sites in an effort to avert potential clashes with the Muslim world, Dayan sought to re-assert Israel’s commitment to the pre-established ‘status quo’ international consensus (International Crisis Group Middle East Report, 2015).
Crucially, Dayan strove to differentiate between the nationalist and religious dimension of the conflict. In attempting to extinguish any potential confrontation between the Muslim and Jewish religions, Dayan endeavoured to confine the Arab-Israeli clash over Jerusalem to a nationalist-territorial dispute. He consequently argued for Islam’s right to exercise religious sovereignty (as opposed to national sovereignty) over Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, setting up the foundations of this historic agreement (Shragai, 2014).
Thus, the ‘status quo’ was formally recognised after 1967. In its most basic form, this international understanding prohibits all non-Muslim worship at the sacred compound but permits non-Muslim visitation. It also covers components such as access regulations, religious rituals and prayers, dress requirements and security protocols (ICG Middle East Report, 2015). Any alterations to these elements by one party violates the ‘status quo’ arrangement. Israel was therefore responsible for the site’s perimeter security only, while the Jordanian-controlled Waqf wielded authority within the compound. This was formally recognised in the 1994 peace treaty between Israel and Jordan (Parker, 2023).
The ‘status quo’ must thus be understood as a legally binding framework which details specific and unique rights and obligations formulated over centuries of religious practice. It is considered as international law and consequently supersedes all aspects of domestic law (Marjieh, 2022).
Dayan’s concession in 1967 demonstrated an alliance of interests between religion and state, which was only achievable due to strict teachings of the Jewish faith itself at the time; with God’s divine presence understood as manifest in the Holy of Holies (the inner sanctuary of the Tabernacle), traditional rabbinical law forbids Jews from entering Temple Mount (Shragai, 2014). This Halakhic restriction was upheld at the time by ultra- Orthodox Rabbis and as a result, prohibiting Jewish worship at the site was not viewed as a matter of heated contention, with the lack of immediate interest in ascending Temple Mount enabling a period of relative stability.
The Argument of Religious Freedom
However, with this consensus among Orthodox Rabbis surrounding the religious importance of the Halakhic restriction diminishing, in recent years, groups committed to overturning the ‘status quo’ are gaining support. Bolstered by increased financial backing, their growing influence is clear in their attempts to recast this issue as one of religious freedom. Fortified by Israel’s ‘Basic Laws’ (which serve as the country’s constitutional foundation), the 1992 law on ‘Human Dignity and Liberty’ describes the country as a “Jewish and democratic state”, while the 1948 ‘Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel’ places the concept of “freedom of religion” at its core (U.S. Department of State 2021 Report on International Religious Freedom, 2022).
Although this is neither a constitutional clause nor statute, the argument for its defence has been used to justify non-Muslim worship at the Al-Aqsa compound. The main proponents are Temple Mount activists, a group of nationalist and ultra- orthodox Jews who reject the ‘status quo’, regarding it as their fundamental historic right to pray at the site. Prominent American Israeli Temple Mount activist, Yehuda Glick encompasses these views, asserting that “there is no reason in the world that at the only holy place for the Jewish people, a Jew should not have the right to pray” (Barker, 2015).
Consequently, religious Zionists continually criticise the government for failing to implement its sovereign prerogatives and ensure full freedom of worship for non-Muslims, with this radical segment of the political right increasingly appealing to both secular and religious supporters, and the liberal side of the political spectrum. Their movement has been propelled by Israeli measures, with the Supreme Court ruling repeatedly since 1993 that Israeli Jews have the right to pray at Al-Aqsa/Temple Mount. This went further in 2006, when the Supreme Court held that there cannot be blanket infringements of that right (ICG Middle East Report, 2015).
Recent Challenges to the ‘Status Quo’
With mounting tensions creating a dangerously volatile situation, there have been multiple incidents in the twenty-first century which have continued to erode the ‘status quo’. A notable flashpoint was in 2000, when Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon entered the Jerusalem sacred space with six Likud Knesset members and 1,000 Israeli police, just before the election (Knell and Berg, 2023). With his visit triggering the second intifada – plunging the country into a violent five- year nationalist and religious conflict – his election to Prime Minister in 2003 oversaw the restoration of Jewish and non-Muslim access to the holy site without the agreement of Jordan (Marjieh, 2022). Disregarding this coordination of access, a central component of the ‘status quo’, such an act only precipitated further heated conflagrations.
In 2014, tensions were ignited after Temple activist Yehuda Glick was shot four times in an attempted assassination. In response, Israeli authorities temporarily shut off all access to the site, including for Muslims (Eisenbud, 2014). The highly inflammatory nature of this measure was encapsulated in Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas labelling the closure “a declaration of war”, going on to urge Palestinians to use “any means” to protect the holy site (Margalit, 2014).
Over the following days with further riots and clashes at the compound, Jordan withdrew its ambassador to Tel Aviv in “protest at the increasing and unprecedented Israeli escalation in the Noble Sanctuary, and the repeated Israeli violations of Jerusalem” (Margalit, 2014). This was the first time Jordan had taken such an active step since the 1994 peace treaty with Israel. However, despite this, Israel has continued to maintain that no changes were being made to the ‘status quo’.
The international response has only contributed to the increasing hostility both sides harbour towards one another. In 2016, UNESCO passed a major resolution regarding the sacred compound – Document 200 EX/25, known as the Occupied Palestine Resolution. This condemned Israel’s increasing aggression and antagonism. It denounced Israel’s illegal actions against the Al- Aqsa Waqf and called for restored Muslim access, demanding that Israel respect the Status Quo and end its attacks. This resolution sparked outrage from Israel due to its exclusive terminology, which called the site only by its Muslim name and spoke of it as a solely Muslim site (Marjieh, 2022).
AFP Photo
In contrast, Donald Trump’s decision to move the US embassy to Jerusalem during his presidency was also seen as providing full support for Israeli sovereignty over the entire city, including the Arab parts and the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount. This was accompanied by his strongly pro-Israeli 2020 peace plan which stipulated the transfer of the compound’s sovereignty to Israel (ending Jordan’s custodianship over it) and calling for freedom of worship for non-Muslims at the site (Zalzberg, 2020).
Today, Israeli forces are stationed inside the holy site, exerting complete control over who enters the compound. Non-Muslims can only enter through the Al-Magharbeh Gate however, with the Waqf banned from wielding any authority over the Gate, militarised Temple Mount activists and Israeli extremists are no longer prevented from entering (Marjieh, 2022). During Ramadan in 2021, Israeli National Police entered Al-Aqsa Mosque on multiple occasions. In one instance, they disconnected the loudspeakers used for the Waqf’s call to prayer after it disrupted an official Memorial Day service for fallen soldiers attended by Israeli President Reuven Rivlin (U.S. Department of State 2021 Report, 2022).
On another day, the Israeli police entered the compound equipped with stun grenades, rubber tipped bullets and teargas to disperse Palestinians they say were throwing rocks, while on 29 May last year, Israeli occupation authorities allowed 2,600 Israeli settlers who were part of the annual ‘flag march’ (celebrating Israel’s occupation of the eastern part of the city in 1967) to storm into Al- Aqsa Mosque with Israeli flags and recite Jewish prayers (Marjieh, 2022).
Today: Israel’s Far–Right Government
The erosion of the ‘status quo’ continues to set a dangerous precedent, with tensions only building with the establishment of the new nationalist government in Israel. On the 3rd of January 2023, National Security Minister, Itamar Ben-Gvir of the new cabinet directly challenged the international agreement by visiting the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound – his first public act in office (being sworn in only five days earlier). Surrounded by Israeli security forces (of which he is the head), Ben-Gvir’s highly controversial visit has greatly inflamed relations with the Muslim people. The incident has already sparked international criticism, with the Palestinian foreign ministry wholly condemning “the storming of Al-Aqsa Mosque” viewing it as an act of “unprecedented provocation and a dangerous escalation of the conflict” (Pfeffer, 2023).
This incendiary atmosphere is only exacerbated by Ben-Gvir’s own outspoken personal views on what he deems as a raging sovereignty battle. Leader of the Jewish Power Party, his entrance into mainstream politics under Israel’s new right-wing government has made the situation in Jerusalem increasingly combustible. Throughout his political career, Ben-Gvir has called for Jewish worship to be permitted at the site, making it known ahead of the November election that he would demand the introduction of “equal rights for Jews” in the Esplanade (Knell and Berg, 2023).
Ben-Gvir’s actions in the sacred compound only fortify the demands of the far-right religious nationalist movement, bolstering Temple activists and religious Zionists calling for long overdue overturning of the ‘status quo’.
The U.N. held an emergency session this year on the fifth of January due to increasing concerns over escalating tensions as the ‘status quo’ looks increasingly under siege (Magid, 2023). The formation of this new government – the country’s most extreme right-wing administration in history – has enabled ultranationalist and ultra-orthodox Jewish parties to gain a major footing in influencing the direction of Israel’s policy line towards Jerusalem (Berg, 2022). No longer simply wielding marginal support, the expansion of their authority to a position of political strength throws the whole future of the ‘status quo’ into question. There is a real danger of renewed violence erupting as these radical groups push for a greater Jewish presence at the holy Esplanade.
Bibliography:
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